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The latest boom in commodity prices fueled concerns about fiscal policies in commodity-exporting
countries, with many claiming that it triggered loose fiscal policy and left no funds for a rainy day.
This paper examines the links between fiscal policy and terms-of-trade fluctuations using a sample
of 74 countries, both developed and developing.   It finds evidence that booms in the terms of trade
do not necessarily lead to larger government surpluses in developing countries, particularly in emerging
markets and especially during capital flow bonanzas.   This is not the case in OECD countries, where










After several years of relatively stable commodity prices, volatility has returned, fueling 
as always worries about its effects on overall economic stability around the world. This time 
around, the debate is also focused on fiscal policy. During the boom that started in 2003, 
concerns were raised that commodity price increases were encouraging excessive government 
spending in resource-abundant countries, leaving no funds for a rainy day. For example, the 
Inter-American Development Bank 2007 Annual Report is entitled All that Glitters May Not Be 
Gold, partly in reference to the fiscal positions of Latin American countries during the latest 
boom in commodity prices. This report concludes that the fiscal surpluses observed during this 
period are far from reassuring since they are based on inflated and unsustainable fiscal revenues 
due to transitory increases in the price of commodities. In fact, the report concludes that when 
government revenues are estimated at the ‘long-run’ prices of commodities, the average fiscal 
position of these countries has deteriorated with deficits averaging 4 percent of GDP. 
This concern is not limited to Latin America. Both in academic and policy circles the 
debate regarding what governments in commodity producer countries should do when their terms 
of trade improve has intensified. A new proposal based on neo-classical models of fiscal policy 
supports the creation of Commodity Sovereign Wealth funds. According to this proposal, fiscal 
policy should be acyclical, with government consumption smoothed over the business cycle and 
savings accumulating in boom times to provide funding for a rainy day. In fact, this policy has 
been at the core of the IMF recommendations for countries dependent on commodity exports.
1   
This paper does not examine the role of these funds but rather pays particular attention to the 
effects of terms of trade cycles on fiscal positions around the world. 
Relying on data for 74 countries for the period 1960-2008, this paper examines the 
evidence on the cycles in the terms of trade and those of fiscal policy. In particular, it studies the 
behavior of government expenditure, revenues, and primary balances, as well as inflation. The 
paper examines separately the evidence on countries grouped by income levels. It also 
disaggregates the sample along a variety of dimensions, by (i) differentiating episodes of capital 
flow bonanzas from those when international capital flows are at their historical lows, (ii) 
differentiating episodes of terms of trade booms from those of terms of trade crashes, (iii) 
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separating the responses of countries with persistent terms of trade shocks from those with 
transitory terms of trade shocks, (iv) comparing responses during periods of more rigid exchange 
rate regimes separately from more flexible arrangements, and (v) examining separately the fiscal 
responses in commodity-exporting countries. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly discusses the theoretical literature 
on fiscal policy used to interpret the results on terms of trade and fiscal policy cycles. Section III 
provides a visual representation of alternative fiscal policies and terms of trade cycles around the 
world by focusing on the evidence of just two countries: Argentina and Norway. Section IV 
extends the analysis of fiscal responses to the whole sample of 74 countries using panel data 
estimation techniques. Section V contains concluding remarks. 
II. Models of Fiscal Policy 
A number of models have been proposed to explain the cyclical behavior of fiscal 
policies. Keynesian models provide the rationale for countercyclical fiscal policy.   In these 
models, the fiscal authority has an objective function that penalizes deviations of output from 
trend. Since an increase in government spending and/or a reduction in tax rates expands output 
(and vice versa), fiscal policy will be countercyclical. In contrast, neoclassical models rationalize 
acyclical fiscal policy since roughly constant tax rates over the business cycle reduce distortions 
(see Chari and Kehoe, 1999). Moreover, if government spending is endogeneized (by, say, 
providing direct utility), neo-classical models predict that it would be optimal for it to behave in 
a similar way to private consumption and hence would be acyclical in the presence of complete 
markets (Riascos and Végh, 2003).  
In contrast to Keynesian and neo-classical recommendations, recent empirical literature 
has noted that while fiscal policy is acyclical or countercyclical in developed countries, it is 
procyclical in most developing countries, with fiscal policy probably exacerbating the business 
cycle in those countries. This begs the question of why these countries follow policies that tend 
to create macroeconomic instability. Theoretical models suggest two possible explanations. The 
first one relies on the presence of distortions in international capital markets. For example, Gavin 
and Perotti (1997), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), and Guerson (2004) argue that 
developing countries face credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing in bad times. 3 
 
Hence, they are ‘forced’ to repay in bad times, which requires a contractionary fiscal policy. In 
the same vein, Riascos and Végh (2003) show that incomplete markets could explain procyclical 
fiscal policy as the outcome of a Ramsey problem without having to impose any additional 
frictions.  
The second strand of the literature relies on a political economy explanation. For 
example, Tornell and Lane (1999) develop a model in which competition for a common pool of 
funds among different units (ministries, provinces) leads to the so-called ‘voracity effect,’ 
whereby expenditure could actually exceed a given windfall. Taking as given such a political 
distortion, Talvi and Végh (2005) show how policymakers would find it optimal to run smaller 
primary surpluses in good times by increasing government spending and reducing tax rates.
2    
While political distortions can be present in all countries, a number of authors have 
concluded that these distortions can be more widespread in resource-rich economies where non-
resource taxes are low and resource rents are high. For example, Lane and Tornell (1996) argue 
that resource-rich economies are subject to more extreme rent-seeking behavior than resource-
poor economies because national politics is oriented to appropriating the rents earned by the 
natural resource endowments. In their model, a windfall coming from a terms-of-trade 
improvement can lead to sharp increases in spending, a distorted allocation of spending over 
time, dissipated revenues, and a collapse in growth.    
There is also an important literature that links fiscal policy with exchange rate regimes. 
Conventional wisdom indicates that fixed exchange rates provide more fiscal discipline than 
flexible exchange rates (see, for example, Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1991); Aghevli, 
Khan, and Montiel (1991); and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)). The claim is that fixed rates induce 
more discipline because the sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to a 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg. In 
contrast, Tornell and Velasco (2000) argue that flexible exchange rate regimes trigger more 
austere fiscal policies. They examine the role of exchange rate regimes using an intertemporal 
model with endogenous optimal fiscal policy. In this model, loose fiscal policies are costly under 
both fixed and flexible exchange rates. While under fixed exchange rates bad behavior today 
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leads to punishment tomorrow (when reserves are depleted and a costly currency crisis starts), 
under flexible exchange rates unsound fiscal policy manifests itself immediately through 
movements in the exchange rate. The difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these 
costs. They show that if fiscal authorities are impatient, flexible rates – by forcing the costs to be 
paid up-front – provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative agent. 
Finally, the last strand of the literature on suboptimal macropolicies concludes that 
distortionary macroeconomic policies are likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional 
problems, such as lack of enforcement of property rights and repudiation of contracts. As 
Acemoglu et al (2003) conclude, in societies with institutional problems, politicians may be 
forced to pursue unsustainable policies in order to satisfy various groups and remain in power. 
III. Fiscal Stance and Terms of Trade Cycles: A Tale of Two Countries 
To grasp the distinct characteristics of cycles in the terms of trade and the fiscal stance 
around the world, visual evidence from two commodity-exporting countries is presented. The 
first country is a developing economy, Argentina, the second one is a developed economy, 
Norway. On average, the share of commodity exports in total exports in both countries oscillates 
around 70 percent. Figure 1 shows the cycles in the terms of trade as well as the cycles in 
government expenditure, government revenues, and the primary balance. In this figure and also 
in the panel estimations in Section IV, I identify cycles by using the ubiquitous Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter. Figure 1 also reports pairwise correlations between the cyclical components of the 
terms of trade and the fiscal stance for the two economies. While these correlations only provide 
a metric of contemporaneous comovements, Section IV explores potential temporal causal 
patterns.
3 
It should also be noted that only government expenditure provides a measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy. As discussed extensively in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), 
government revenues and the primary balance depend on the tax base (output or in this case  the 
terms of trade), with the correlations between these two indicators and output (or terms of trade) 
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and are described in Table A1 in the appendix.    
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providing in most cases ambiguous information on the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
4 Still, in order 
to examine whether the fiscal stance tends to be loose when the terms of trade improve, the paper 
is also concerned with the cycles in government revenues and primary balance. 
As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, while government expenditure is highly 
countercyclical in Norway, this is not the case in Argentina where government expenditure 
becomes increasingly procyclical since the early 1990s. Again, the evidence from the middle and 
lower panels indicates that booms in the terms of trade in Argentina did not trigger higher public 
savings; in fact, the primary balance is below trend when Argentina’s terms of trade improve. 
The evidence from Norway is in stark contrast, with the fiscal stance improving with booms in 
the terms of trade.    
IV. Panel Estimation 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) examine the cyclical characteristics of fiscal and 
monetary policies around the world and find that developing countries (in particular, middle 
income countries) follow procyclical policies while industrialised countries implement acyclical 
or countercyclical policies. In a similar vein, this paper documents the relationship between 
booms and busts in the terms of trade and government expenditure and revenues, primary 
balances, and inflation. The purpose of this paper is not to examine the cyclical characteristics of 
fiscal policy but to evaluate whether fiscal positions of countries around the world deteriorate or 
improve with terms of trade cycles. 
As discussed in Section II, political and institutional distortions are at the core of models 
of suboptimal fiscal policy. Since these distortions are more widespread in developing countries, 
I examine separately the evidence on countries grouped by income levels. The World Bank 
classification in 2008 is used to divide the sample into groups of low-income, lower-middle-
income, upper-middle-income, and high-income (OECD) countries (see the Appendix for 
details).  
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the correlation of tax revenues with the business (or terms of trade) cycle is ambiguous. 6 
 
Even within the panel estimation by income groups, I also examine the possibility of non-
linear relationships between the various measures of the fiscal stance and fluctuations in the 
terms of trade as suggested by the various models of fiscal policy.   
First, as discussed in Gavin and Perotti (1997), I examine whether the relationship 
between the fiscal stance and the terms of trade depends on the degree of liquidity in 
international capital markets, that is, on the ability of countries to tap international capital 
markets. To identify liquidity in international capital markets, I follow Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2008) who identify capital flow bonanza episodes country by country
5 using a sample of 181 
countries and then tally, year by year, the number of countries with capital flow bonanzas. An 
index of worldwide bonanzas is then constructed. This index indicates the proportion of 
countries with an episode of capital flow bonanza in any given year.    I identify episodes of 
worldwide capital flow bonanzas when the Reinhart and Reinhart index indicates that at least 20 
percent of the countries are found to be having a capital flow bonanza. This metric identifies 
1978-1983, 1991-1993, 1998, and 2005-2008 as periods of worldwide capital flow bonanza. 
Second, models with liquidity constraints and overall imperfections in capital markets 
also suggest that fiscal responses in bad states (when, for example, terms of trade deteriorate) 
may be more procyclical than those in good times, with government introducing draconian 
reforms in response to a collapse in the terms of trade due to lack of access to credit. Thus, I also 
examine whether the fiscal stance responds asymmetrically to booms and busts in the terms of 
trade.   I identify good times (terms of trade booms) as those years when the terms of trade are 
above their trend and bad times (terms of trade busts) as those years when they are below their 
trend, with the trend estimated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.   
Third, the response of the fiscal stance to terms of trade fluctuations may depend on the 
exchange rate regime. To test for this, episodes of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes are 
identified by using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto exchange rate regime classification. 
For this paper, it is enough to define two exchange rate regimes: fixed or predetermined 
exchange rates, and flexible exchange rates (which are defined as including any regime in which 
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the exchange rate is allowed some flexibility). Flexible exchange rate regimes include clean 
floats (which are rare) and dirty floats (which are more common). 
Fourth, many have argued that fiscal authorities tend to believe that good times are more 
permanent than they really are, leading to too much spending or a reduction in tax rates in times 
of terms of trade booms. According to this hypothesis, the fiscal stance responds equally to 
transitory and persistent terms of trade shocks. To examine this hypothesis, I classify shocks into 
transitory and persistent following the analysis in Kent and Cashin (2003). These authors 
estimate equations of the form: 
           t i t i i i t i tot c tot , 1 , , μ φ + Δ + = Δ −          (1) 
where  tot Δ  is the growth rate of the terms of trade. The coefficient φ  captures the degree of 
persistence of the shocks, with shocks becoming more persistent as φ  approaches 1 in absolute 
value. Again, following Kent and Cashin (2003), transitory and permanent terms of trade shocks 
are separated by first estimating the half-life of a shock (HLS): 
          )) log( / ) 2 / 1 (log( abs φ = HLS          (2) 
For each income group, countries with persistent terms of trade shocks are identified as those 
countries with shocks that have a half-life larger than the median value of the half-life of shocks 
in the group. The rest of the countries are identified as countries with transitory terms of trade 
shocks.
6 
Finally, I also examine whether responses to terms of trade shocks are different in 
resource-abundant economies. The IMF (WEO) classification scheme is used to identify 
resource-abundant countries as those where commodity-related export earnings account for more 
than half of total export earnings. Using the United Nations COMTRADE data provided by the 
UN Statistical Department, for each country and for every year of the sample, the share of non 
fuel primary products commodity exports (Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 0, 
1 2, 4, and 68) plus fuel exports (SITC 3) in total exports is calculated. For each country, a 
                                                            
6 The classification of countries into countries with persistent terms of trade shocks and those with transitory terms 
of trade shocks is done using all sample data. Governments do not have all of this information when deciding on 
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dummy variable is created that is equal to one when commodity export shares are above 50 per 
cent and zero otherwise.    
As in Section III, cycles in the fiscal stance, economic activity, and the terms of trade are 
identified using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The indicators are obtained from the IMF 
(WEO) database and are described in Table A1 of the appendix.    
To examine the links between the fiscal stance and the terms of trade the following 
regression using fixed effects panel techniques is estimated. Each regression takes the form: 
       t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,       ε δ γ β α + + × + + =           (3) 
where cY represents alternatively the cycle in government expenditure, government revenue, the 
primary balance and inflation; ctot is the cycle in the terms of trade; I is an indicator used to 
examine the presence of non-linearities; and X captures the state of the business cycle, that is, the 
output cycle of each country. 
The simplest strategy is to estimate the model in Equation (3) using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions. However, cycles in economic activity as captured by cycles in GDP are 
endogenous, so we may be capturing reverse causality. In this case, OLS regressions will give 
results that do not correspond to the causal effect of economic activity on the fiscal stance. Thus, 
Equation (3) is estimated using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with lagged values of GDP 
cycles as instruments for current values of GDP cycles.    
In the regressions, I test sequentially each possible non-linearity between the fiscal stance 
and the terms of trade. More precisely, when examining for the effect of liquid international 
capital markets, the index I is equal to one during episodes of worldwide capital flow bonanzas 
and zero otherwise. When examining the presence of asymmetric responses to booms and busts 
in the terms of trade, the index I is equal to one when the country experiences a terms of trade 
boom and zero otherwise. When studying whether countries respond differently to transitory and 
permanent terms of trade shocks, I is equal to one for countries with permanent shocks and zero 
otherwise. When evaluating whether the exchange rate regime matters, the indicator I is equal to 
one when the country adopts a flexible exchange rate regime and zero otherwise. Finally, when 
studying whether resource-abundant economies respond differently to terms of trade shocks, I is 
equal to one for resource-abundant countries and zero otherwise. That is, the coefficient β  will 
capture, respectively, the response of the fiscal indicator to terms of trade fluctuations in times of 9 
 
illiquidity in world capital markets, in times when the terms of trade are not booming, in 
countries with transitory terms-of-trade shocks, in years of fixed exchange rate regimes, and in 
countries which are not resource-abundant.  γ β +  will capture, respectively, the response of the 
fiscal indicators to terms of trade shocks at times of capital flow bonanzas, in times of booms in 
the terms of trade, in countries with permanent terms-of-trade shocks, in years with flexible 
exchange rates and in resource-abundant countries.    
Tables 1–4 show the panel regressions for cycles in government primary balances, 
government revenues, government spending, and inflation, respectively. Four panel models are 
estimated separately according to income groups: high-income (OECD) countries, upper-middle-
income countries, lower–middle-income countries, and low-income countries.    
For each fiscal indicator, there are 6 regressions. The top regression provides the 
benchmark. The other five regressions allow for non-linearities in the responses to terms of trade 
shocks. Each regression includes the terms of trade cycle; the coefficient of this variable is β  
(from Equation 3). The next variable captures the possible non-linear effects. The coefficient on 
this variable is γ  (from Equation 3). The final variable is the GDP cycle. The coefficient of this 
variable is δ (from Equation 3). 
Table 1 shows the relationship between cycles in fiscal primary balances and cycles in 
the terms of trade and overall GDP. It is important to highlight the varied responses across the 
different income groups. First, fiscal balances in OECD countries increase when output is above 
trend, suggesting the presence of countercyclical or acyclical fiscal policies.
7 This is not the case 
in developing countries. In middle-income countries, fiscal balances tend to decline when output 
is above trend, suggesting more procyclical policies, while in low-income countries, fiscal 
balances are uncorrelated with GDP cycles. To examine whether the responses are economically 
significant, I estimate the elasticity of fiscal balances to GDP cycles (evaluated at the mean value 
of primary-balance and GDP cycles).
8 The elasticities of primary balances with respect to GDP 
cycles are: 2.00 for OECD countries, -0.60 for upper-middle-income countries, and -0.04 for 
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lower-middle-income countries, indicating strong responses in both high-income and upper-
middle-income countries.   Second, fiscal balances in OECD and low-income countries are not 
affected by terms of trade cycles.  Third, primary balances responses to terms of trade cycles in 
middle-income countries are affected by the extent of liquidity in international capital markets, 
episodes of terms of trade booms or busts, and exchange rate regimes.  As shown in regression 
(1), in times of international capital market liquidity, the response of fiscal balances to terms of 
trade cycles in lower-middle-income countries is negative, with the fiscal balance deteriorating 
in good times (when the terms of trade are above trend) and improving in bad times (when they 
are below trend), suggesting procyclical responses to terms-of-trade fluctuations.    In the case of 
upper-middle-income countries, the response of fiscal balances to terms of trade cycles while  
still positive in episodes of capital flow bonanza it is significantly smaller indicating a less 
countercyclical policy than during episodes of illiquidity in international capital markets.  For 
upper-middle-income countries, the elasticity of fiscal balances to terms of trade cycles is equal 
to 2.00 in times of illiquid international capital markets and 1.00 in episodes of capital flow 
bonanza. The corresponding elasticity for lower-middle-income countries is respectively 0.40 
and -0.10.  Also, as shown in regression (2), there is evidence of asymmetric responses to terms 
of trade booms and busts. The fiscal balance of upper- and lower-middle-income countries 
responds less countercyclically in times of terms of trade booms. Again in this case, responses in 
upper-middle-income countries are stronger in terms of elasticity (2.00 and 1.00 for upper-
middle-income countries and 0.30 and -0.10 for lower-middle-income countries, respectively for 
times of terms of trade busts and for times of terms of trade booms).   Furthermore, as shown in 
regression (3), responses to terms of trade cycles in middle-income countries depend on the 
exchange rate regime. Flexible exchange rate regimes seem to fuel more countercyclical fiscal 
policies in both upper–middle and lower-middle-income countries, providing some support to the 
model in Tornell and Velasco (2000).  Third, as shown in regression (4), for most income 
groups, the degree of persistence of terms of trade shocks does not seem to matter. Surprisingly, 
primary balances of upper-middle-income countries tend to improve more in countries with more 
persistent terms of trade.
9 Fourth, responses to terms of trade cycles in commodity-abundant 
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countries are significantly different from those in non-commodity producing economies only in 
the upper–middle-income group.   
Table 2 shows the responses of government revenues to fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
As in the previous table, all the regressions control for cycles in GDP and allow for non-linear 
responses to terms of trade shocks. While the results in this table indicate that fiscal revenues 
increase with output across all groups of countries, these responses are far stronger in OECD 
countries. For the high-income group, the elasticity is equal to 0.80. In contrast, the elasticities of 
government revenues with respect to the cycles in GDP vary from 0.03 for lower-middle-income 
countries and 0.32 in low-income countries, with the elasticity of upper-middle-income countries 
equal to 0.12. Again, the responses to terms of trade cycles in middle-income countries are 
different from those in OECD and low-income countries. In OECD and low-income countries, 
government revenues are uncorrelated with terms of trade cycles. For middle-income countries, 
Table 2 indicates that while there is an overall positive link between government revenues and 
terms of trade cycles (a sign of either countercyclical or acyclical responses to terms of trade 
shocks), this link is weaker or even reversed in times of international capital flow bonanzas and 
in episodes of terms of trade booms (evidence of more procyclical responses to terms of trade 
cycles). Table 2 also shows that the exchange rate regime affects the responses of government 
revenues to terms of trade cycles. Again, for upper-middle-income countries, responses of 
government revenues to terms of trade cycles tend to be more countercyclical during floating 
exchange rates, with elasticities of 0.60 and 0.20 under flexible exchange rate and fixed 
exchange rate regimes, respectively. In contrast, for lower-middle-income countries, fiscal 
revenues seem to become more procyclical during flexible exchange rate regimes. Lastly, as 
shown in Regression 5, government revenues in middle income countries are only positively 
related to terms of trade cycles in resource abundant countries.     
Table 3 shows the responses of government spending to terms of trade cycles and the 
overall business cycle. Supporting previous results in the literature, Table 3 shows that responses 
to GDP cycles in OECD countries are countercyclical, while they are procyclical in all 
developing countries (as captured by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the 
GDP cycle). Responses to terms of trade cycles are also different across countries in different 
income groups.  Overall, terms of trade cycles do not affect government spending in OECD and 12 
 
low-income countries.  Interestingly, responses of government spending to terms of trade 
fluctuations are countercyclical in upper–middle-income countries but procyclical in lower-
middle-income countries. Importantly, when examining the role of the exchange rate regime in 
the responses to terms of trade shocks, the evidence suggests that government spending in 
middle-income countries is countercyclical only when exchange rates are floating.    
Table 4 links inflation to fluctuations in the terms of trade. The experience in low- and 
middle-income countries with bouts of hyperinflation and overall chronic inflation during most 
of the years of the sample examined suggests that terms of trade fluctuations are not the main 
drivers of inflation. The results in Table 4 confirm this expectation. The evidence for OECD 
countries indicates that overall inflation increases when economic activity is strong. 
Interestingly, inflation declines with increases in the terms of trade, suggesting perhaps the 
effects of lower commodity prices since most of the OECD countries are commodity importers.
10    
Table 5 examines in more detail the responses of the fiscal stance to terms of trade cycles 
in resource abundant countries. This table only reports the responses in upper-middle-income 
countries because the results in Tables 1-3 indicate that it is in this group of countries where the 
fiscal stance responds significantly different in commodity-producing countries. In particular, 
Table 5 explores whether responses to terms of trade cycles in resource-abundant countries are 
affected by episodes of capital flow bonanzas, terms of trade booms and busts, and fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes. The estimated regression in Table 5 is 




t i t i
com
t i t i t i i t i X I I ctot I ctot ctot cY , , , , , , , , ,         ε δ ρ γ β α + + × × + × + + =        (4) 
where: 
com I captures whether the country is a commodity-abundant country; and 
j I  captures 
alternately the episodes of capital flow bonanzas, booms in the terms of trade, and episodes of 
flexible exchange rate regimes. 
As in Tables 1-3, the results in Table 5 indicate that terms of trade cycles in the upper-
middle-income group only affect the fiscal stance in commodity-abundant countries. While fiscal 
policy in upper-middle-income countries is procyclical with respect to fluctuations in GDP, it is 
countercyclical with respect to terms of trade fluctuations. However, the degree of 
countercyclicality declines sharply in episodes of capital flow bonanza and in times of booms in 
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the terms of trade, suggesting that the claim that “all that glitters might not be gold” may in fact 
have some support. In particular, the combination of booms in the terms of trade and the increase 
in liquidity in international capital markets from 2003 to 2008 may have fueled an easy fiscal 
policy in commodity-abundant countries with access to international capital markets. In contrast, 
the results in Table 5 suggest that the degree of countercyclicality increases during episodes of 
flexible exchange rates. The results on the links between exchange rate regimes and fiscal policy 
are preliminary and need to be examined in a larger sample of commodity-abundant countries, 
but the possibility that flexible exchange rates may contribute to less distortionary fiscal policies 
merits our full attention.  
V. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the links between the fiscal stance and terms of trade cycles. 
While still much more analysis needs to be undertaken to refine our understanding of the links 
between the terms of trade fluctuations and fiscal policies, the main findings of the paper can be 
summarized as follows: 
i)  Confirming the results in the empirical literature, the results in this paper indicate that 
fiscal policy is countercyclical in OECD countries (vis à vis GDP). In contrast, fiscal 
policy is procyclical (vis à vis GDP) in developing countries. 
ii)  In OECD and low-income countries, fiscal policy is acyclical with regards to the 
terms of trade. Moreover, the responses of the fiscal stance to terms of trade cycles 
are not affected by international capital liquidity, exchange rate regimes, or the degree 
of persistence of the shocks.    
iii) For upper-middle-income countries, there is evidence of fiscal policy 
countercyclicality with respect to the terms of trade. But the degree of 
countercyclicality declines in episodes of capital flow bonanzas or during episodes of 
terms of trade booms, suggesting that in those episodes these countries may not be 
saving enough for a rainy day. Importantly, flexible exchange rate regimes seem to 
contribute to a more countercyclical fiscal policy. 
iv) For lower-middle-income countries, there is even evidence suggesting that fiscal 
policy responds procyclically to terms of trade fluctuations, that is, there is evidence 14 
 
that fiscal policy contributes to reinforce the terms of trade cycle. Again, as in upper-
middle-income countries, episodes of capital flow bonanza and terms of trade boom 
fuel even more procyclicality while flexible exchange rate regimes enhance 
countercyclicality.
11    
These findings suggest that the boom in commodity prices during the latest episode of 
capital flow bonanza of 2003-2008 may have fueled a procyclical policy in middle-income 
countries that reinforced the terms of trade cycle. While a variety of models explain why 
countries follow these suboptimal fiscal policies, we need to find mechanisms that would enable 
macro-policies to be conducted in a neutral or stabilizing way. In this regard, the suggestive 
results on flexible exchange rates for upper–middle-income countries deserve our full attention. 
 
                                                            
11  I should note that in lower-middle-income countries, flexible exchange rates seem to contribute to lower 
government revenues when the terms of trade increase. However, this effect is not significant from an economic 
point of view.   The elasticity of the government revenues with respect to terms of trade cycles in these countries are 
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Government Revenues





















































Notes: The above figures show the cycles in government expenditure, revenues, and the primary balance together with the cycles in the terms of trade for Argentina and Norway.  The cycles are 
estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The correlation statistics in each panel show the pairwise correlation between each indicator of fiscal policy cycles and the terms of trade cycles.
correlation since 1990 = - 0.2 correlation before 1990 = 0.5; correlation since 1990 = 0.9







































































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Terms of Trade
Primary BalanceRegressions Explanatory Variables




High Income (OECD) Upper Middle Income Lower Middle Income Low Income
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value
constant ‐0.03 (0.93) 0.003 (0.87) 0.07 (0.97) 0.01 (0.99)
Benchmark Terms of Trade 0.06 (0.13) 0.31 (0.00) 0.16 (0.25) 0.001 (0.98)
GDP 0.01 (0.00) ‐0.003 (0.00) ‐0.001 (0.00) 1E‐4 (0.77)
Terms of Trade 0.04 (0.53) 0.40 (0.00) 0.59 (0.01) ‐0.02 (0.65)
1T e r m s  of Trade x  Capital Flow Bonanzas ‐0.15 (0.10) ‐0.17 (0.01) ‐0.75 (0.02) 0.06 (0.46)
GDP 00 1 (0 00) 0 003 (0 00) 0 001 (0 00) 0 0002 (0 76)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP 0.01 (0.00) ‐0.003 (0.00) ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.76)
Terms of Trade 0.06 (0.29) 0.44 (0.00) 0.43 (0.06) 0.04 (0.53)
2T e r m s  of Trade x Terms‐of‐Trade Booms ‐0.00 (0.98) ‐0.23 (0.00) ‐0.57 (0.14) ‐0.08 (0.46)
GDP 0.01 (0.00) ‐0.002 (0.00) ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.76)
Terms of Trade 0.02 (0.61) 0.10 (0.03) ‐0.12 (0.68) 0.02 (0.68)
3T e r m s  of Trade x Flexible Exchange Rates 0.27 (0.11) 0.20 (0.00) 0.27 (0.41) ‐0.01 (0.92)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP 0.01 (0.00) ‐0.002 (0.00) ‐0.001 (0.00) ‐0.0002 (0.76)
Terms of Trade 0.07 (0.11) ‐0.01 (0.87) 0.09 (0.75) ‐0.03 (0.56)
4T e r m s  of Trade x Persistent Terms of Trade Shocks ‐0.08 (0.57) 0.48 (0.00) 0.08 (0.80) 0.06 (0.41)
GDP 0.01 (0.00) ‐0.003 (0.00) ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.0001 (0.79)
Terms of Trade 0.06 (0.12) 0.002 (0.98) 0.04 (0.86) ‐0.03 (0.58)
5T e r m s  of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries ‐0.05 (0.70) 0.38 (0.00) 0.18 (0.53) 0.10 (0.27)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
5 Terms of Trade x Commodity Producing Countries 0.05 (0.70) 0.38 (0.00) 0.18 (0.53) 0.10 (0.27)
GDP 0.01 (0.00) ‐0.003 (0.00) ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.78)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 Regressions Explanatory Variables




High Income (OECD) Upper Middle Income Lower Middle Income Low Income
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value
constant 0.05 (0.90) 0.003 (0.99) ‐0.12 (0.95) ‐0.01 (0.99)
Benchmark Terms of Trade ‐0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (0.00) 0.26 (0.02) ‐0.03 (0.25)
GDP 0.004 (0.00) 0.001 (0.24) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade ‐0.07 (0.24) 0.11 (0.00) 0.42 (0.02) ‐0.03 (0.50)
1T e r m s  of Trade x  Capital Flow Bonanzas ‐0.10 (0.29) 0.01 (0.93) ‐0.49 (0.09) ‐0.03 (0.72)
GDP 0 004 (0 00) 0 001 (0 23) 0 001 (0 01) 0 003 (0 00)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP 0.004 (0.00) 0.001 (0.23) 0.001 (0.01) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.01 (0.82) 0.15 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) ‐0.02 (0.71)
2T e r m s  of Trade x Terms‐of‐Trade Booms ‐0.06 (0.52) ‐0.12 (0.01) ‐0.77 (0.02) ‐0.02 (0.81)
GDP 0.004 (0.00) 0.001 (0.21) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade ‐0.02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.22) 0.60 (0.00) ‐0.01 (0.64)
3T e r m s  of Trade x Flexible Exchange Rates ‐0.23 (0.17) 0.06 (0.06) ‐0.63 (0.01) 0.01 (0.68)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP 0.004 (0.00) 0.001 (0.11) 0.001 (0.00) 0.006 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.04 (0.36) ‐0.01 (0.80) 0.03 (0.90) ‐0.04 (0.19)
4T e r m s  of Trade x Persistent Terms of Trade Shocks ‐0.33 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.29 (0.29) 0.03 (0.51)
GDP 0.004 (0.00) 0.0004 (0.41) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade ‐0.02 (0.69) ‐0.01 (0.45) ‐0.02 (0.90) ‐0.04 (0.19)
5T e r m s  of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries 0.02 (0.89) 0.18 (0.00) 0.56 (0.02) 0.05 (0.50)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
5 Terms of Trade x Commodity Producing Countries 0.02 (0.89) 0.18 (0.00) 0.56 (0.02) 0.05 (0.50)
GDP 0.004 (0.00) 0.001 (0.14) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 Regressions Explanatory Variables




High Income (OECD) Upper Middle Income Lower Middle Income Low Income
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value
constant ‐0.07 (0.88) 0.003 (0.94) ‐0.10 (0.96) 0.02 (0.97)
Benchmark Terms of Trade 0.02 (0.62) ‐0.05 (0.00) 0.14 (0.19) ‐0.03 (0.19)
GDP ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.03 (0.69) ‐0.08 (0.00) 0.17 (0.34) ‐0.01 (0.77)
1T e r m s  of Trade x  Capital Flow Bonanzas 0.01 (0.92) 0.02 (0.56) ‐0.16 (0.54) ‐0.08 (0.20)
GDP 0 001 (0 01) 0 002 (0 00) 0 001 (0 09) 0 003 (0 00)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP ‐0.001 (0.01) 0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.09) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.06 (0.32) ‐0.11 (0.00) 0.39 (0.06) ‐0.08 (0.12)
2T e r m s  of Trade x Terms‐of‐Trade Booms ‐0.10 (0.37) ‐0.08 (0.05) ‐0.44 (0.16) 0.07 (0.30)
GDP ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.03 (0.57) ‐0.01 (0.79) 0.54 (0.02) ‐0.03 (0.15)
3T e r m s  of Trade x Flexible Exchange Rates ‐0.08 (0.69) ‐0.08 (0.03) ‐0.72 (0.01) 0.02 (0.43)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.006 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.03 (0.50) ‐0.01 (0.58) ‐0.02 (0.93) ‐0.03 (0.34)
4T e r m s  of Trade x Persistent Terms of Trade Shocks ‐0.08 (0.52) ‐0.06 (0.05) 0.20 (0.44) ‐0.01 (0.91)
GDP ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
Terms of Trade 0.02 (0.60) ‐0.01 (0.60) ‐0.02 (0.91) ‐0.03 (0.33)
5T e r m s  of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries ‐0.03 (0.82) ‐0.08 (0.01) 0.32 (0.16) ‐0.03 (0.68)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
5 Terms of Trade x Commodity Producing Countries 0.03 (0.82) 0.08 (0.01) 0.32 (0.16) 0.03 (0.68)
GDP ‐0.001 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 Regressions Explanatory Variables




High Income (OECD) Upper Middle Income Lower Middle Income Low Income
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value Coefficient P‐Value
constant 0.01 (0.91) ‐1.03 (0.89) ‐3.03 (0.75) ‐0.8 (0.94)
Benchmark Terms of Trade ‐0.04 (0.00) 0.02 (0.97) 0.13 (0.83) ‐2E4 (0.99)
GDP 1E‐4 (0.10) 0.002 (0.90) 5E‐5 (0.96) ‐7E‐4 (0.43)
Terms of Trade ‐0.04 (0.01) ‐0.80 (0.42) 0.16 (0.89) ‐0.03 (0.96)
1T e r m s  of Trade x  Capital Flow Bonanzas ‐0.05 (0.01) 1.43 (0.33) 0.002 (0.99) 0.02 (0.86)
GDP 1E 4 (0 19) 0 003 (0 85) 5E 5 (0 97) 0 001 (0 47)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP 1E‐4 (0.19) 0.003 (0.85) 5E‐5 (0.97) ‐0.001 (0.47)
Terms of Trade ‐0.06 (0.00) 1.04 (0.36) 0.55 (0.63) ‐0.12 (0.13)
2T e r m s  of Trade x Terms‐of‐Trade Booms 0.04 (0.05) ‐1.64 (0.30) ‐0.74 (0.66) 0.20 (0.08)
GDP 1E‐4 (0.11) 0.003 (0.87) 5E‐5 (0.96) ‐0.0001 (0.43)
Terms of Trade ‐0.03 (0.00) ‐0.08 (0.93) ‐0.16 (0.87) 0.27 (0.00)
3T e r m s  of Trade x Flexible Exchange Rates ‐0.07 (0.13) 0.39 (0.76) 0.73 (0.59) ‐0.23 (0.00)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
GDP 1E‐4 (0.02) 2E‐4 (0.99) 1E‐4 (0.93) ‐0.0001 (0.27)
Terms of Trade ‐0.04 (0.00) ‐0.67 (0.45) ‐0.01 (0.99) ‐0.01 (0.86)
4T e r m s  of Trade x Persistent Terms of Trade Shocks ‐0.01 (0.89) 1.09 (0.33) 0.19 (0.88) 0.03 (0.75)
GDP 1E‐4 (0.10) 8E‐4 (0.95) 5E‐5 (0.96) ‐0.001 (0.43)
Terms of Trade ‐0.04 (0.00) ‐0.30 (0.72) ‐0.14 (0.87) ‐0.01 (0.81)
5T e r m s  of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries ‐0.03 (0.89) 0.52 (0.62) 0.51 (0.67) 0.03 (0.80)
t i t i
j
t i t i t i i t i X I ctot ctot cY , , , , , ,                 
5 Terms of Trade x Commodity Producing Countries 0.03 (0.89) 0.52 (0.62) 0.51 (0.67) 0.03 (0.80)
GDP 1E‐4 (0.10) 0.002 (0.89) 9E‐5 (0.94) ‐0.0001 (0.41)
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t i t i t i i t i X I I ctot I ctot ctot cY , , , , , , , , ,                       
Terms of Trade 0.002 0.004 0.003 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.02
(0.97) (0.95) (0.96) (0.49) (0.44) (0.31) (0.61) (0.61) (0.52)
Terms of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries 0.46 0.57 0.11 0.30 0.24 0.08 ‐0.17 ‐0.13 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81)
Terms of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries x Capital Flow Bonanzas ‐0.17 ‐0.11 0.11
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Terms of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries x Terms‐of‐Trade Booms ‐03 5 ‐01 0 00 8
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t i t i t i i t i X I I ctot I ctot ctot cY , , , , , , , , ,                       
Terms of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries x Terms‐of‐Trade Booms ‐0.35 ‐0.10 0.08
(0.01) (0.05) (0.15)
Terms of Trade x Commodity‐Producing Countries x Flexible Exchange Rates 0.37 0.15 ‐0.13
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
GDP ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R‐Squared 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.11
Nb f Ob ti 360 360 324 426 498 454 426 498 454
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com
t i t i t i i t i X I I ctot I ctot ctot cY , , , , , , , , ,                       
Number of Observations 360 360 324 426 498 454 426 498 454
F‐Statistic 7.87 8.47 5.51 5.71 4.72 2.90 1.60 1.70 1.37
Prob(F‐Statistic) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.13)
Note: p‐values are in parentheses.
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AppendixCambodia Albania Argentina Australia
Côte D’Ivoire Angola Brazil Austria
Ethiopia Cameroon Bulgaria Belgium
Kenya China Chile Canada
Lao Colombia Costa Rica Denmark
Malawi Congo, Republic of Latvia Finland
Mozambique Egypt Lebanon France
Nigeria El Salvador Lithuania Germany
Pakistan Honduras Malaysia Greece
Senegal India Mexico Hungary
Tanzania Indonesia Panama Iceland
Uganda Iran Poland Ireland
Vietnam Jordan Russia Italy
Yemen Morocco South Africa Japan
Paraguay Turkey Korea
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Note: The total number of countries is 74.
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Table A2
Countries in the Sample
Low-Income Countries 
(14) 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries  (21)
Upper Middle Income 
Countries                
(17)
High Income OECD 
Countries                
(22)